

2-00 P.M.

Statement by the Minister for Public Works**Re : Water Conducting System of Sharavathi Hydro-Electric project—
damages to**

Sri H. M. CHANNABASAPPA (Minister for Public Works and Electricity).—Sir, on 26th June 1972, on the Floor of the Mysore Legislative Assembly in pursuance of the assurance held out on 20th June 1972 on the damages observed in the Water Conductor System of Sharavathi Hydro-Electric Project.

1. Water required for generating power in Sharavathi Valley Hydro Electric Project is drawn from Linganamakki Storage to Talakalale balancing reservoir through a power channel and Malali tunnel. Water is further conducted from this reservoir to the generating units through two Vodenbyle Pressure tunnels, surge tanks and penstocks. Each tunnel feeds five generating units, through five penstocks.

2. It is proposed to limit the scope of this factual note only to items of work in which damages have taken place resulting in losses and adverse comments.

They are :—

1. Linganamakki dam sluice gates.
2. Power channel.
3. Talakalale dam.
4. Vodenbyle Pressure Tunnel No. 1.

3.1 *Linganamakki Dam Sluice Gates* :—Three sluices—each measuring 8' x 14' are provided in the Linganamakki Dam for discharge of water into the power channel for generating power. Sluice vents comprise of rubble masonry in cement mortar for hearing and cut-stone masonry in cement mortar for sides. 1 : 2 : 4 cement concrete is laid around embedded parts and the floor of the sluice for a distance of 10' from the gate grooves. Over the remaining length 9' burnt stone slabs are laid on 1:2:4 cement concrete bed. The gates are used to regulate the discharge. All the three gates can be opened simultaneously and operated round the clock. There is no steel lining inside sluice vents. The depth of water over the cill level is 130' at Full Reservoir Level.

3.2 The sluices were commissioned in 1964. Alarming damages were noticed for the first time on 16th February 1970 when cut-stones were noticed in the stilling basin below the sluices. After getting reports of inspection, the Chief Engineer has reported to Government in March 1970 as follows :

- (1) "In the central vent the cement concrete around the embedded parts on either side of the gate has been scoured to a height of 5' from the floor of the vent."

- (2) "The cut-stone masonry including the masonry behind it on either side of the vent starting from the embedded section has been dislodged and washed away."
- (3) "Cavity that has been created is about $15' \times 3' \times 4'$ on the right side and $10' \times 3' \times 5'$ on the left side."

Similar damages are reported to have taken place in the other two sluices, damaging the side masonry in length of 17' to 24', for a width of 4' and height of 5'. Prompt action is reported to have been taken to fill up the cavities with concrete and to repair the damages to the embedded parts. Help of the Mysore Engineering Research Station was sought by the Chief Engineer to locate the causes for the damages. On 26th April 1970, the Director of Mysore Engineering Research Station is reported to have visited and examined the situation. On 10th August 1970, the Professors of the Indian Institute of Science inspected the vents. In March 1971, the Central Water and Power Commission was also requested to suggest remedial measures. In the intervening periods, piece-meal repairs were done at frequent intervals as and when it was possible to take a shut down right upto 11th June 1972.

3.3 During the course of repairs, great difficulties were experienced in lowering and raising of gates—particularly above 7'. Though they could be raised upto 14', it is feared that any such raising may result in serious consequences of the gates being stuck up somewhere leading to a helpless situation. The damages caused to the sluices are, therefore, of a major magnitude. The Mysore Power Corporation is looking into the matter with a sense of urgency to set matters right. Government is also examining the causes for the damages with a view to fixing up responsibilities.

Power Channel

4.1 The Power Channel constitutes the life line of the water conductor system. Its original design was based on the experience gained in the construction of the channel of the Mahatma Gandhi Hydro Electric Project. When the work of channel was in progress, the Civil Engineering Committee of the H.E.C.P. Board found that the soil through which the power channel was excavated was treacherous. The side slopes in some portions actually slipped down right up to the bay and cracks developed in deep-cut portions. In pursuance of the technical opinion, the water conductor system up to the entrance to Malali Tunnel was made of reinforced cement concrete duct with open cover wherever it runs in deep cuts and without cover in other reaches. After the exit of the Malali tunnel, it is an open cut channel with the sides and bed concreted or gunited.

(SRI H. M. CHANNABASAPPA)

4. 2. The duct was constructed by M/s. Mysore Concrete Construction Company at a cost of Rs. 1.86 crores as per the design submitted by the firm and approved by the H.E.C.P. Board. Considerations of Economy appear to have led to this decision. Work was completed in May, 1964. The duct was commissioned in August, 1964.

4. 3. During the monsoon of 1963, i.e., even before the channel was commissioned to service, there was an upheaval of the bed slabs of the duct in chainage between 1900 to 2000. This was got repaired. Again during the monsoon of 1964, before the commissioning of the duct there was found to be 140 feet of longitudinal crack of 1/8th inch to 1/4 inch and also an upheaval in the bed slab between chainage 4100 to 4300. The damages were got repaired. The total cost of repairs of both the occasions was of the order of Rs. 3 lakhs. Government felt deeply concerned over the damages. On the advice of the H.E.C.P. Board and C.W.P.C., a number of protective measures, such as, construction of filter drains on both sides of the duct were executed at a cost of about Rs. 22 lakhs.

4.4. The serious damages in the bed of the duct that occurred in 1963 and 1964, were discussed at length by the H.E.C.P. Board on more than one occasion. The damages have been attributed to excessive uplift pressure of sub-soil water which was higher than that for which the bed was designed. The filter drains constructed during repairs all along the power channel appear to have eased these pressures to some extent. Unless the channels are closed completely and the water drained, it would be difficult to say to what extent the pressures have been eased and whether any further damages have occurred to the bed of the duct. A minimum depth of 8 feet of water is being maintained throughout in the canal on technical advice to counteract further upheavals taking place. So far, the channel has not been drained in order to examine further damages, if any, as it would involve substantial curtailment of power generation.

4.5. Apart from the damages that have occurred to the bed, it has been noticed that there have been extensive leakages in the expansion joints in the bed slab and side walls on either side. The total loss of water from the channel on all accounts, including the leakage, has been found to be of the order of 7 to 18 cusecs during different times of the year. Leakages in the joints referred to above have been causing cavities here and there washing out the supporting earth behind the side walls. As and when they occur, action is being taken to fill up the cavities with the tunnel muck so as to maintain the support to the side walls.

4.6. Issues pertaining to Power channel are very complicated. Wholesale shut down poses serious problems. Unless this is done, we cannot assess the nature and extent of the damages caused, devise

suitable remedial measures and fix up the responsibilities. A suggestion was however made in November, 1964, for constructing an alternative conductor system to connect Linganamakki and Talakalale reservoir as a solution which is estimated to cost about Rs. 3 to 4 crores.

Talakalale Dam

5.1. The work of construction of Talakalale Dam at an estimated cost of Rs. 2.76 crores was commenced in October, 1959 and completed in May, 1963 by Shri M. S. Ramaiah. When water was stored in the dam partially in June 1963, sweating was noticed in the down-stream face of the dam from end to end. With the erection of crest gates in May 1964 and the increase in the level of the reservoir, there was a noticeable increase in the seepage and a few spouts were observed. Pressure grouting was done by the Department at a cost of Rs. 70,000 during February-April 1965. When the reservoir reached its full level, seepage, spouting and leakage were on the increase. The leakage water was found to contain lot of leached material from the dam. Government felt greatly concerned about the leakage and ordered comprehensive cement grouting on the advice of the Hydro-Electric Construction Project Board in March 1964, at an estimated cost of Rs. 6.65 lakhs. The actual expenditure incurred was of the order of Rs. 7.25 lakhs. This grouting is reported to have achieved some results. Leakage is however still continuing in some measure. It is ascertained that proposals to take up extensive secondary and tertiary grouting at an estimated cost of over Rs. 30.00 lakhs has been under consideration for some years past.

5.2. From the files maintained during construction, it is revealed that sub-standard masonry work has been done continuously on the Dam flouting all oral and written instructions of supervisory officers. It is reported that the Special Chief Engineer, Sharavathi Valley Project has also ordered warnings to be given to the contractor that in the event of development of leakages, he has to do the grouting at his own cost.

5.3. On the recommendation of the Hydro-Electric Construction Project Board, and in view of the seriousness of the damages, Government asked the Vigilance Commission in June 1966 to conduct a detailed investigation and fix up responsibilities. The report of the Vigilance Commission was received in January 1972. Amongst other things, the report says that the leakages in the dam could only be due to bad workmanship, i.e., due to construction of hollow masonry rather than use of bad surki mortar below specifications. It further adds that there has been a failure of duty on the part of the supervisory officers right from the lowest to the highest level to get the work done according to the specifications. List of officers to be held responsible for the leakage has been appended to the report. The matter is engaging the attention of the Government.

(SRI H. M. CHANNABASAPPA)

Vodenbyle Pressure Tunnels

6.1. There are two pressure tunnels—the first feeding 5 generating units of the station and the second feeding three units at the moment. The first tunnel is 3511' long and the other 3434' long. The internal diameter of each one of these tunnels is 22'. The thickness of the concrete lining all round is $1\frac{1}{2}'$ and is designed for a maximum velocity of 13.65' per second.

6.2. The construction of these two tunnels including approaches was done by M/s. Hindustan Co., Ltd., at a cost of Rs. 1.29 crores. Concrete work in respect of tunnel No. 1 was commenced in October 1961 and the tunnel was commissioned in 1964. Tunnel No. 2 was commissioned in 1965. In September 1968, the Engineers in charge of maintenance of the station noticed that some foreign material was entering the per-stock connected to tunnel No. 1 and damage was being caused to the buckets of the turbines. The tunnel was inspected in November 1968 and the Chief Engineer (Investigation), H.E. and I.P. reported to Government as follows :

- (i) That there were a number of pot holes at frequent intervals in the bottom surface of the tunnel ;
- (ii) The plaster had come out in a few places ;
- (iii) The concrete in the roof portion had been removed in many construction joints (40 in number). In many cases, the reinforcements had also been exposed. In a few cases, the pot holes in the roof portion extended upto the rock surface over which the concrete was laid.

6.3. After further inspection, when the work was taken up for repairs by the Hindustan Construction Company under the supervision of the Chief Engineer, he reported to Government in January 1969 that the area and depth of the pits required to be filled in had increased enormously and consequently the quantum of work involved was 3 to 4 times more than what was anticipated earlier. The report indicated that some of the pits to be filled in the roof were as big as 10' to 12' long, 8' to 12' wide and 1' to $1\frac{1}{2}'$ deep. As many as 155 out of 170 joints required to be gunited.

6.4 Government was thus apprised of the magnitude and seriousness of the damages. Repairs were ordered. Nothing more was done to probe into the matter. Government ordered repairs through Hindustan Construction Company at a cost of Rs. 1.03 lakhs. The work consisted of filling up the pits and pockets of the tunnel with concrete and guniting with weld-mesh in layers. The repairs were completed in February 1969. The problem was, however, not referred to the H. E. C. P. Board inspite of its gravity and importance, for reasons not known.

6.5. The Accountant General wrote to the Chief Engineer on 24th January 1969 seeking the reasons for the expenditure on repairs so soon after the commissioning of the tunnel. The Chief Engineer informed him on 13th May 1969 that the damages were not due to bad or defective work by the contractors. A study of a large number of letters and reports from the Construction and Quality Control Engineers relating to the day-to-day execution of the work, including quality control results, reveals that sub-standard materials like jelly and sand have been used and that the quality of work was poor and far below prescribed specifications. Gross violations of the instructions issued by officers to the contractor in writing and recorded in the order form appear to have been quite frequent. Some of the more important observations on the quality of materials used and failures on the part of the contractor are mentioned below :—

- (1) The jelly used for concrete consisted of soft, foliated, friable and schistose material unfit for concrete in pressure tunnel.
- (2) Over-size metal of 3" to 4" size was also used contrary to prescribed specifications.
- (3) The sand used contained light fragments, injurious and inferior materials, clay and organic impurities which would render the concrete incapable of resisting abrasive action of water in pressure tunnels.
- (4) During the construction period, the contractor has flouted directions and instructions from the Executive Engineers and other supervisory officers.
- (5) Contractors carried out concrete work during nights without supervision by the officers and in spite of specific directions to the contrary.
- (6) The concrete work done was often found to be far below prescribed specifications. On many occasions it consisted of honeycombs. Directions given to contractor for filling them by chiselling and grouting were flouted. Plastering was done overnight cancelling the defective work.

6.6. The files maintained during the period show that as many as 81 letters and reports were recorded, out of which 47 were done by the Quality Control Inspecting Officers and the rest by the Construction Units. All of them have recorded that either the workmanship or the materials used or both were sub-standard and below specifications. In this context, it is not clear as to how the Chief Engineer wrote to the Accountant General that the damages were not due to bad work. Subsequently, the Accountant General wrote to Government in September 1969 asking whether the damages were due to defective design. On the advice of the Chief Engineer, Government informed the Accountant General that cavitation which caused the damages was

(SRI H. M. CHANNABASAPPA)

a natural phenomenon. This conclusion does not appear to have been based with reference to facts, data and proper verifications as is the case with the former conclusion about the quality of work. He has also said that it is not due to bad design.

6.7. In April 1972, pieces of concrete, steel rods, over-size stones, etc., were found collected in the turbine pits, after damaging the needles and buckets of the runner wheels of the turbine. An inspection by the Chairmen and Engineers of the Mysore Power Corporation and the Mysore State Electricity Board was arranged on 16th April 1972 to look into the causes for the damage. The Minister for Public Works and Electricity was also present. The inspection of pressure tunnel No. 1 disclosed the following :—

- (1) It was found that practically the entire concrete surface both in the bottom and the sides of the tunnel were very rough and eroded by abrasive action.
- (2) Series of cavities, big and small, were found both in the bottom and sides of the tunnel.
- (3) The dimensions of the cavities varied from 3 to 4 feet in length, 6" to 2 feet in width and 3" to 15" in depth.
- (4) The special feature of the cavities was that it contained loose jelly which could be scooped out by hand, indicating complete absence of binding material.
- (5) There was seepage of water in some of the joints.
- (6) A few jets about 1" to 2" in diameter were seen shooting water into the tunnel under great pressure from sides through the concrete lining.
- (7) The portions repaired in 1968 were found to be intact even after a period of over 3 years.

6.8 One of the Turbine Runner Wheels was also inspected.

The inspection revealed the following:—

- (1) The buckets of the runner wheel were found to have been damaged causing innumerable dents and cuts on the splitters;
- (2) The edges of some of the buckets were found to have been broken. The breakage was up to 2 cms. in length in a few cases.

6.9. In the opinion of the Chairman of the Mysore Power Corporation Ltd., the presence of loose jelly in the cavities referred to above indicates that quality control and supervision during the laying of the concrete has slackened as the work progressed. He has said that it is difficult to assess the extent of the area and depth filled by loose jelly until the cavities are excavated or opened out.

6.10. The Mysore Power Corporation is now seized of the matter. It is making arrangements for carrying out repairs during August-September 1972 by having a shut down for some days. During this period there would be enough water in reservoirs not only in the State but also in the neighbouring States from whom power could be borrowed to minimise the shortage in the power supply in the State.

6.11. The Public Accounts Committee expressed a desire to inspect the tunnel. In view of the proposed early shut down for repairs, the Committee was informed that this opportunity could be availed of for inspection in order to avoid an additional shut down. It is understood from the Mysore State Electricity Board that a shut down for a period of 36 to 48 hours would result in a direct loss of revenue to the tune of about Rs. 8 lakhs to the Board, in addition to indirect losses of considerable magnitude to industries and commercial establishments.

7.1. The damages caused to the Linganamakki dam sluices and the likely danger in lifting the gates to their full height of 14' are causing serious concern. The lurking dangers in the Power channel can by no means be under-estimated. The leaks resulting in the formation of cavities and the repeated filling of the cavities with tunnel muck to support the side walls of the R. C. C. duct are only temporary measures to avert likely dangers. Assessment of further damages subsequent to the two upheavals and longitudinal cracks in the bed of the duct in 1963 and 1964 has not been possible as a minimum of 8' water has to be maintained to counteract the sub-soil upward pressure and prevent further upheavals. Shut downs for the purposes of such inspection pose problems of financial losses besides exposing the channel bed to further upheavals. The position in regard to Talakalale dam is not different. The leakage is causing a small anxiety. The damages observed in the Vodenbyle tunnel and the runner-wheel of the connected turbine have caused great concern. These damages appear to have become a recurring affair.

7.2. In conclusion, the aggregate damages observed in all these four components of the water conductor system of S. V. H. E. P. namely, the sluices, Power Channel, Talakalale dam and the Vodenbyle Pressure tunnel are not only a matter of great anxiety to all concerned but also call for immediate attention and lasting remedy, irrespective of the magnitude of efforts and costs involved. The Mysore Power Corporation is earnestly seized of the matter with a sense of urgency demanded by the situation. Government is also applying its mind to all the aspects of the question including location of the causes for the damages in the several components of the Water Conductor System not only with a view to set matters right but also to examine the failure in duties of all concerned and fix up responsibilities. Thank You.

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್.ಡಿ. ದೇವೇಗೌಡ (ಹೊಳೇನರಸೀಪುರ).—ಮಾನ್ಯ ಇನ್‌ಫರ್ಮೇಷನ್ ಮಿನಿಸ್ಟರ್‌ನವರು ತಮ್ಮ ಮಾತಿನ ಪ್ರಕಾರ ಈ ವಿಷಯ ಸಭೆಯ ಮುಂದೆ ಒಂದು ಫ್ಯಾಕ್ಟುಯಲ್ ರಿಸ್ಟೇಬಲ್‌ನನ್ನು ಇಟ್ಟಿದ್ದಾರೆ ಅವರು ಇಲ್ಲಿಯವರೆಗೂ ಹೇಳಿದ್ದನ್ನು ನಾನು ಬಹಳ ಕುತೂಹಲದಿಂದ ಕೇಳಿದೆ. ಈ ಸಭೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಬಹುಶಃ ಶ್ರೀ ಕೆ. ಲಿಂಗಪ್ಪನವರು ಮತ್ತು ಶ್ರೀ ಟಿ. ಆರ್. ಶಾಮಣ್ಣನವರು ಇದರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಚರ್ಚೆಯಾಗಬೇಕು ಎಂದು ಹೇಳಿದಂತೆ ನನಗೆ ಜ್ಞಾಪಕ. ಆದರೆ ನಾನು ನನ್ನ ಪರವಾಗಿ ಹೇಳುವುದಾರೆ ಇದರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಇಲ್ಲಿ ಚರ್ಚೆ ಮಾಡುವುದು ಅನಾವಶ್ಯಕ. ಈಗತಾನೇ ಮಾನ್ಯ ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳು ತಮ್ಮ ಭಾಷಣದಲ್ಲಿ ತಿಳಿಸಿದಂತೆ ಅಲ್ಲಿ ನಡೆದಿರತಕ್ಕ ಕೆಲಸದಲ್ಲಿ ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕ ದೋಷ, ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಗಳ ಸೂಪರ್‌ವಿಷನ್‌ನಲ್ಲಿ ದೋಷ ಮತ್ತು ಇನ್ನೂ ಅನೇಕ ಅಡ್ಡಿನಿಷ್ಟೇಟಿವ್ ರೋಪದೋಷಗಳಿವೆ ಎಂಬುದಾಗಿ ತಿಳಿದು ಬರುತ್ತದೆ. ಇದರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಒಂದು ಜುಡಿಷಿಯಲ್ ಪ್ರೋಬ್ ನಡೆಸುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಇರತಕ್ಕ ತೊಂದರೆಯಾದರೂ ಏನು? ಅಲ್ಲಿ ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕವಾಗಿ ನಡೆದಿರತಕ್ಕ ರೋಪದೋಷಗಳನ್ನು ಕುರಿತು ಇಲ್ಲಿ ನಾವು ನಮ್ಮ ಒಪಿನಿಯನ್ನನ್ನು ಎಕ್ಸ್‌ಪ್ರೆಸ್ ಮಾಡುವುದಕ್ಕಾಗುವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ನಾವೇನಿದ್ದರೂ ಇಲ್ಲಿ ಆ ಅಡ್ಡಿನಿಷ್ಟೇಟಿವ್ ರೋಪದೋಷಗಳ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ನಮ್ಮ ಅಭಿಪ್ರಾಯಗಳನ್ನು ವ್ಯಕ್ತಪಡಿಸಬಹುದು. ಆದರೆ ಆ ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕ ರೋಪದೋಷಗಳ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಯಾರು ತಪ್ಪಿತಸ್ಥರು ಅವರು ಮಾಡಿರತಕ್ಕ ತಪ್ಪು ಎಂಥದೂ ಎಂಬುದನ್ನೆಲ್ಲಾ ಈಗ ಮಾನ್ಯ ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳು ಕೊಟ್ಟ ಹೇಳಿಕೆಯ ಮೇಲೆ ಇಲ್ಲಿ ಚರ್ಚೆ ಮಾಡುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಬಹಳ ಕಷ್ಟವಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಇದರಲ್ಲಿ ನಾವು ಇಷ್ಟೆಲ್ಲಾ ಏಕೆ ಗೊಂದಲ ಬೀಳಬೇಕು? ಅಲ್ಲಿ ಏನೇನು ತಪ್ಪುಗಳು ನಡೆದಿವೆ ಅದಕ್ಕೆ ಯಾರು ಜವಾಬ್ದಾರರು ಎಂಬುದನ್ನು ಪತ್ತೆ ಮಾಡಿ ತಪ್ಪಿತಸ್ಥರನ್ನು ಬಲಿಹಾಕಿ, ಅದಕ್ಕೆ ನನ್ನ ತಕರಾರೇನೂ ಇಲ್ಲ. ಇಷ್ಟಾಗಬೇಕಾದರೆ ಆ ಜುಡಿಷಿಯಲ್ ಕಮಿಟಿಗೆ ಇಬ್ಬರನ್ನು ಆ ಸೆಂಟ್ರಲ್ ವಾಟರ್ ಅಂಡ್ ಪವರ್ ಕಾರ್ಪೊರೇಷನ್ನಿನಿಂದ ಕರೆಸಿ ಒಬ್ಬರು ಹೈಕೋರ್ಟಿನ ಜಡ್ಜಿಗಳಾಗಿರತಕ್ಕವರನ್ನು ಇದಕ್ಕೆ ಹಾಕಿ ಅಲ್ಲಿ ಏನೇನು ತಪ್ಪುಗಳು ನಡೆದಿವೆ ಅವುಗಳನ್ನು ಕಂಡುಹಿಡಿದು ಅವುಗಳಿಗೆಲ್ಲಾ ಯಾರು ಯಾರು ಜವಾಬ್ದಾರರು ಎಂಬುದನ್ನು ಪತ್ತೆ ಹಚ್ಚಿ ಅವರಿಗೆ ಕ್ರೂರವಾದ ಶಿಕ್ಷೆಯನ್ನು ಮಾಡಿ ಅದಕ್ಕೆ ಯಾರೂ ಬೇಡವೆನ್ನುವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ಇದು ನಿಜವಾಗಿಯೂ ಬಹಳ ದುಃಖಕರವಾದ ಸಂಗತಿ. ಆ ಶರಾವತಿ ವಿದ್ಯುಚ್ಛಕ್ತಿ ಯೋಜನೆ ನಮ್ಮ ನಾಡಿನ ಜೀವನಾಡಿಯಾಗಿದೆ. ಅಂಥ ಒಂದು ಬೃಹತ್ ಕಾರ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಇಂಥ ರೋಪದೋಷಗಳಿರಬಾರದು. ಆಗ ಆ ಕೆಲಸಗಳು ನಡೆಯತಕ್ಕ ಕಾಲದಲ್ಲಿ ಅಲ್ಲಿದ್ದವರು ಬಹಳ ಅಕ್ಷಮ್ಯ ಆಪರಾಧಗಳನ್ನು ಮಾಡಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ಇಡೀ ದೇಶಕ್ಕೆ ಅವರು ಅನ್ಯಾಯ ಆಪರಾಧವನ್ನು ಮಾಡಿದ್ದಾರೆಂದು ಹೇಳಬಹುದು. ಅಲ್ಲಿ ತಲಕಲೆ, ಲಿಂಗನಮಕ್ಕಿ ಪ್ರೆಷರ್ ಟನರ್ ಮತ್ತು ಒಡ್ಡೆನ್ ಬೈರ್ ಅರೆಲ್ಲ ಏನೇನು ತಪ್ಪಾಗಿದೆ—ಅದರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ನಮ್ಮ ಸೂಪರ್ ಇಂಜಿನಿಯರ್—ನೀವು ಬಂದ ನಂತರ ಪ್ರಮೋಟ್ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದರಲ್ಲಿ ಅವರು ಏನು ಮಾಡಿದ್ದಾರೆ ಇದರ ಬಯಲಿಗೆ ಬರಬೇಕು.

ಶ್ರೀ ಸಿ. ಎಂ. ಅರ್ಮುಗಂ (ಕೆ. ಜಿ. ಎಫ್.).—ಆ ಸೂಪರ್ ಇಂಜಿನಿಯರ್ ಯಾರು? ಅವರ ಹೆಸರೇನು?

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಡಿ. ದೇವೇಗೌಡ. —ಅವರ ಹೆಸರನ್ನು ಹೇಳಬಾರದೆಂದೇನೂ ಇಲ್ಲ ಅವರ ಹೆಸರು ಮಗದುಂ ಎಂದು. ಸರ್ಕಾರದವರು ಈ ವಿಚಾರದಲ್ಲಿ ನಿಷ್ಪಕ್ಷಪಾತವಾದ ವಿಚಾರಣೆಯನ್ನು ಮಾಡಿ ಸರಬೇಕು. ಅಲ್ಲಿ ಪ್ರಾಮಾಣಿಕವಾದ ಹೇಳಿಕೆಗಳಮೇಲೆ ವಿಚಾರಣೆ ನಡೆಯಬೇಕು. ಹಾಗಿಲ್ಲದೆ ಯಾರೋ ಒಬ್ಬ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಯ ಹೇಳಿಕೆ ಮೇಲೆ ಇದನ್ನು ವಿಚಾರಣೆಗೆ ತೆಗೆದುಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದಕ್ಕಾಗುವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ಸರ್ಕಾರ ಈ ವಿಚಾರದಲ್ಲಿ ಹಿಂದು ಮುಂದು ನೋಡಬಾರದು. ಆದರೆ ಅವರ ರೀತಿಯನ್ನು ಸರ್ಕಾರದವರು ಈಗ ಮೈಸೂರು ಪವರ್ ಕಾರ್ಪೊರೇಷನ್‌ಗೆ ವಹಿಸಿರತಕ್ಕದ್ದು ಒಂದು ಅಂಗವಾಯಿತು. ಅದರಲ್ಲಿ ಅಲ್ಲೇಗೆ ಏನೇನು ನಡೆದಿದೆ ಎಂದು ಇಲ್ಲಿ ಚರ್ಚೆಮಾಡುವುದು ಬೇಡ. ಇದನ್ನು ನೇರವಾಗಿ ಆ ಜುಡಿಷಿಯಲ್ ಎನ್‌ಕ್ವೈರಿಗೆ ಆರ್ಡರ್ ಮಾಡುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಸರ್ಕಾರಕ್ಕೆನು ತೊಂದರೆ ಇದೆ! ಅದನ್ನು ತಿಳಿಸಲಿ.

ಶ್ರೀ ಟಿ. ಆರ್. ಶಾಮಣ್ಣ (ಕೋಟೆ).—ಮಾನ್ಯ ಸಭಾಪತಿಯವರೇ, ಈ ಆಗಿರತಕ್ಕ ಆಪಾರ ನಷ್ಟ ಮತ್ತು ಬೇಜಾವಾಬ್ದಾರಿ ಕೆಲಸಗಳ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ನಾಕಮ್ಸ್ ವಿವರಣೆಗಳನ್ನು ಮಾನ್ಯ ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳು ಕೊಟ್ಟಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ಇದು ನನಗೆ ಅನಿಸುತ್ತಿದೆ ಸರ್ಕಾರದವರು ಇದರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಒಂದು ಜುಡಿಷಿಯಲ್ ಎನ್‌ಕ್ವೈರಿಗೆ ಆಜ್ಞೆ ಮಾಡಿ ಈ ಚರ್ಚೆಗೇ ಅವಕಾಶವಿಲ್ಲ—ಇದು ಸಬ್‌ಜುಡೀಸ್ ಎಂದು ಹೇಳಬಹುದು ಎಂದು ನಾನು ನಿರೀಕ್ಷಿಸಿದ್ದೆ. ಇದರಲ್ಲಿ ಯಾರ್ಯಾರು ಏನೇನು ತಪ್ಪುಗಳನ್ನು ಮಾಡಿದ್ದಾರೆಂಬುದನ್ನು ಕಂಡುಹಿಡಿದು ಅವರನ್ನು ಶಿಕ್ಷೆ ಮಾಡಲು ಒಂದು ಜುಡಿಷಿಯಲ್ ಎನ್‌ಕ್ವೈರಿಯನ್ನು ಕೂಡರೆ ನೇಮಕ ಮಾಡಬೇಕೆಂದು ನಾನು ಒತ್ತಾಯಮಾಡುತ್ತೇನೆ. ಹಿಂದೆ ಇದರ ವಿಚಾರಣೆಯನ್ನು ಬದಿಗೊತ್ತುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಯಾರು ತಮ್ಮ ಪ್ರಭಾವವನ್ನು ಬೀರಲು ಅವಕಾಶವಿತ್ತೋ ಅವರು ಈಗಲೂ

ಇದ್ದಾರೆ. ಅದಕ್ಕೆ ಅವಕಾಶ ಇರಬಾರದು ಅಲ್ಲ ಡಿಪೆಕ್ಟೀವ್ ಸೂಪರ್‌ವಿಜನ್ ಮತ್ತು ಡಿಪೆಕ್ಟೀವ್ ವರ್ಕ್ಸ್‌ಹೀಗೆ ಇನ್ನೂ ಏನೇನೋ ಲೋಪದೋಷಗಳು ಇರುತ್ತವೆಂದು ಮಾನ್ಯ ಸಚಿವರು ಹೇಳಿರುವುದರಿಂದ ಮುಂದೆ ಆ ನಮ್ಮ ಪವರ್ ಸಪ್ಲೈಗೇದೊಡ್ಡ ಧಕ್ಕೆ ಉಂಟಾಗಬಹುದು. ಒಂದು ದಿವಸ ಪವರ್ ಸಪ್ಲೈನಿಂತರ 8 ಲಕ್ಷ ರೂಪಾಯಿ ನಷ್ಟವಾಗುತ್ತೆ. ಇಲ್ಲಿ ಚರ್ಚೆ ಮಾಡುವುದರ ಬದಲು ಒಂದು ಜುಡೀಯರ್ ಎನ್‌ಕ್ವೈರಿಯನ್ನು ಬೇಗ ನೇಮಕ ಮಾಡಬೇಕೆಂದು ನಾನೂ ಕೂಡ ಒತ್ತಾಯ ಮಾಡುತ್ತೇನೆ.

ಶ್ರೀ ಕೋಣಂದೂರು ಲಿಂಗಪ್ಪ (ತೀರ್ಥಹಳ್ಳಿ).—ಮಾನ್ಯ ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳು ಏನು ಈಗ ಒಂದು ಹೇಳಿಕೆಯನ್ನು ಕೊಟ್ಟರು ಅದು ಕೇವಲ ಒಂದು ಮುಖವಾಯಿತು. ಅವರು ಇನ್ನೊಂದು ಮುಖದ ವಿಚಾರ ವನ್ನೇ ಎತ್ತಿಲ್ಲ. ಆ ಇನ್ನೊಂದು ಮುಖ ಎಂದರೆ ಅಲ್ಲ ನಡೆದಿರತಕ್ಕ ಲಂಚದ ಪ್ರಪಂಚ. ಮಾನ್ಯ ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳ ಹೇಳಿಕೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಇದನ್ನು ಕೈಬಿಟ್ಟಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ಜುಡೀಷಿಯರ್ ಎನ್‌ಕ್ವೈರಿ ನಡೆದರೆ ಇದೂ ಕೂಡ ಅದರಲ್ಲಿ ಅಳವಡುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಸಾಧ್ಯವಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಅಲ್ಲ ಅನೇಕ ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕ ಲೋಪದೋಷಗಳಿವೆ ಎಂದು ಹೇಳಿದ್ದು ಇಡೀ ಭಾರತಕ್ಕೇ ಹೆಸರಾದಂಥ ಇಂಜಿನಿಯರನ್ನು ಅಂದರೆ ಭಾರತ ರತ್ನ ಎಂಬ ಬಿರುದನ್ನು ಪಡೆದ ರಾಜ್ಯಕ್ಕೆ ತಲೆತಗ್ಗಿಸುವಂಥ ವಿಚಾರ ಇದೆ. ಆದರೆ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಕೂಡಲೇ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಂಗ ವಿಚಾರಣೆಗೆ ಆಜ್ಞೆ ಮಾಡಬೇಕೆಂದು ಒತ್ತಾಯ ಮಾಡುತ್ತೇನೆ.

2-30 P.M.

Sri C. M. ARUMUGAM.—The other day the Hon. Minister said he would give us a complete report about this Sharavati Project. But now he has given a report concerning only about pressure tunnels. Secondly, he has mentioned about the defects that took place from 1963 onwards and upto 1962 he was the Public Works Minister. The point I wish to emphasize here is that the facts now revealed were not to be found in the white paper presented to this House by the then Hon. Chief Minister, Sri S. Nijalingappa in 1965. The information now furnished as also that furnished in the white paper were the information furnished by the Secretaries and Chief Engineers. Now the same Administrative Officers have given a different picture and therefore it is necessary to make a comparison of the white paper and the present statement of the Hon. Minister Sri Channabasappa, placed before this House. I request that a copy should be given to us and we must have ample opportunity to discuss the matter. Further there are so many loopholes in the construction of Sharavati Project involving so many companies. We therefore want a complete report and there should also be a judicial probe in the matter. Some of the Members could also visit the project some time in August. I once again request that few days may be allotted for discussing the statement placed by the Hon. Minister and also there is nothing wrong in holding a Judicial Enquiry in the matter.

Sri V. N. PATIL.—I want to know whether the Government would agree to the fact that there should be a thorough discussion on this subject in this House. The Hon. Minister has done full justice in revealing the facts. It is a question pertaining not only to Mysore State but also to other States and therefore I would request the Speaker and the Government to allow a thorough discussion on the matter by the hon. members.

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಡಿ. ದೇವೇಗೌಡ.—ಈ ವಿಚಾರವನ್ನು ಈ ಸಭೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಚರ್ಚೆಮಾಡಲು ನನ್ನ ವಿರೋಧವಿಲ್ಲ. ಚರ್ಚೆ ಮಾಡಬೇಕೆಂದರೆ ಮಾಡಲಿ. ಮಾನ್ಯ ಸಭಾಧ್ಯಕ್ಷರು ಮತ್ತು ಮಾನ್ಯ ಸಭಾ ನಾಯಕರು ಇದಕ್ಕೆ ಕಾಲ ನೀಡಿಮಾಡಿ ಚರ್ಚೆಮಾಡುವುದಾದರೆ ಮಾಡಬಹುದು. ಶ್ರೀ ಅಮೃತಗಂ ರವರು ಸ್ವಲ್ಪ ವ್ಯಂಗ್ಯಾರ್ಥದಲ್ಲಿ ಹೇಳಿದರು ಎಂಬುದು ನನ್ನ ಭಾವನೆ. ಅದನ್ನು ನಾನು ಸ್ವಾಗತಿಸುತ್ತೇನೆ. 1965 ರಲ್ಲಿ ಶ್ರೀ ನಿಜಲಿಂಗಪ್ಪನವರಿದ್ದರು ಅಧಿಕಾರದಲ್ಲಿದ್ದರು. ಅವರು ದ್ರೋಹ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದರೆ ಪರಿಶೀಲನೆ ಮಾಡಬಹುದು. ನಾನು ಅವರಿಗೆ ಎಚ್ಚರಿಕೆ. ಎಲ್ಲೆಯವರೆಗೆ ದೇಶದ ಜನರು ಅನ್ಯಾಯವಾಗಿದೆ ಎಂದು ಹೇಳುವರೋ ಅಲ್ಲಿಯವರೆಗೆ ಪರಿಶೀಲನೆ ಮಾಡಲು ಯಾವುದೇ ಒಂದು ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮ ತೆಗೆದುಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದನ್ನು ನಾನು ಸ್ವಾಗತಿಸುತ್ತೇನೆ.

ಶ್ರೀ ಚನ್ನಬಸಪ್ಪನವರು ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳಾದಮೇಲೆ ಅವರು ಇಲಾಖೆಯನ್ನು ಸರಿಪಡಿಸುವರು ಎಂಬ ಆಶೆ ನನಗಿತ್ತು. ಇಂಜಿನಿಯರಿಂಗ್ ಇಲಾಖೆ ಅವರು ವಹಿಸಿಕೊಂಡ 15—20 ದಿವಸಗಳಲ್ಲಿ 15—20 ಜನ ಇಂಜಿನಿಯರುಗಳನ್ನು ನನ್ನೆಂಟ್ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ತಮಗೆ ಬೇಕಾದ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಗಳಿಗೆ ಪ್ರಮೋಷನ್ ಕೊಟ್ಟಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ದೇಶಕ್ಕೆ ದ್ರೋಹಮಾಡಿರುವ ಒಂದು ಕಂಟ್ರಾಕ್ಟ್ ಫರ್ಮನಲ್ಲಿದ್ದ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಯನ್ನು ಎಂ. ಐ. ಪಿ. ಸಿ. ಬೋರ್ಡಿನ ಅಫೀಸರಾಗಿ ಹಾಕಿದ್ದಾರೆ, ಅವರನ್ನು ನೂಪರ್ ಇಂಜಿನಿಯರನ್ನಾಗಿ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ಇಂಥವರನ್ನು ಅಲ್ಲಿಗೆ ಹಾಕಿರುವುದು ಸರಿಯೇ? ನಮಗೆ ನ್ಯಾಯ ಸಿಕ್ಕುವುದು ಎಂಬ ಆಶೆ ಏನಿತ್ತೋ ಅದು ಹೋಯಿತು. ಇದನ್ನು ನೋಡಿ ಅಪರಾಧ ತಮ್ಮ ಕೆಲಸವನ್ನು ಸರಿಯಾಗಿ ನಿರ್ವಹಿಸಿಲ್ಲವೆಂದು ಹೇಳಬೇಕಾಗಿದೆ.

ಕೊನೆಯದಾಗಿ, ಶರಾವತಿ ಯೋಜನೆ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಸಭೆ ಚರ್ಚಿಸಬೇಕೆಂದರೆ ಅದಕ್ಕೆ ನನ್ನ ಅಡ್ಡಿಯಿಲ್ಲ. ಆದರೆ ಜುಡಿಷಿಯಲ್ ಪ್ರೊಸೀಡರ್ ನಡೆಯಬೇಕು, ಅದಕ್ಕೆ ಕಾರಾವಕಾಶ ಬೇಡ. ಕಾಲಹರಣ ಮಾಡದೆ ತಕ್ಷಣ ಆ ಕೆಲಸ ಮಾಡಬೇಕು. ಯಾರೇ ಇರಲಿ, ದೊಡ್ಡ ಮನುಷ್ಯರಾಗಲಿ ಯಾರೇ ಇದರಲ್ಲರಲಿ, ನ್ಯಾಯಾಂಗ ವಿಚಾರಣೆ ನಡೆಸಿ ಈ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಬೇಕಾದರೆ ನಿರ್ಣಯಮಾಡಿ ಇಂದೇ ತೀರ್ಮಾನ ಮಾಡಬೇಕೆಂದು ನಾನು ಒತ್ತಾಯಮಾಡುತ್ತೇನೆ.

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಎಂ. ಚನ್ನಬಸಪ್ಪ.—ಮಾನ್ಯ ಅಧ್ಯಕ್ಷರೆ, ತಮ್ಮ ಮತ್ತು ಮಾನ್ಯ ಸಭೆಯ ಸದಸ್ಯರಲ್ಲಿರ ಅಪೇಕ್ಷೆಯ ಮೇರೆಗೆ ಡ್ಯಾಮೇಜನ್ ಆಗಿರತಕ್ಕ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಫ್ಯಾಕ್ಟುಯಲ್ ಸ್ಪೆಷಿಮೆಂಟ್ ಕೊಡಬೇಕೆಂದು ಅಪೇಕ್ಷೆ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದೇನೆ, ಅದರಂತೆ ಕೊಟ್ಟಿದ್ದೇನೆ. ಇದರ ಹಿಂದೆ ಏನೇನು ನಡೆಯಿತು, ಪರಿಮಾಪದ್ಧಿ ಏನೇನು ಎಂದು ಹೇಳಿ ಕೊಣೆಯೊಂದು ಲಿಂಗಪ್ಪನವರು ಕೇಳಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ಸತ್ಯಾಂಶವನ್ನು ಕೊಟ್ಟಿದ್ದೇನೆ ಕೊಡುತ್ತಾ ಇದ್ದೇನೆ. ಎನ್‌ಕ್ವೈರಿ ಮಾಡುತ್ತೇವೆ ಎಂದು ಹೇಳಿ ಅಧಿಕಾರಕ್ಕೆ ಬಂದ ಕೆಲವು ದಿವಸಗಳಲ್ಲೇ ಹೇಳಿದ್ದೇನೆ. ತಾವು ಕೇಳಿದ ಪ್ರಶ್ನೆ ಅಪ್ರೋಪ್ರಿಯೇಟ್ ಆಕ್ಷನ್ ಮೇಲೆ ಟೀಕಾ ಇನ್ ಅಪ್ರೋಪ್ರಿಯೇಟ್ ಟಿಪ್ಪಣಿ ಆಂತ.

Sri H. D. DEVE GOWDA.—Does it mean that it is a judicial probe?

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಎಂ. ಚನ್ನಬಸಪ್ಪ.—ಅಪ್ರೋಪ್ರಿಯೇಟ್ ಆಕ್ಷನ್ ಇನ್ ಕೊಡ್ಸ್ ಜುಡಿಷಿಯಲ್ ಪ್ರೊಸೀಡರ್.

ಈ ವಿಷಯದಲ್ಲಿ ತಾವು ಇವತ್ತು ಎಷ್ಟು ಅನುಕ್ರಮದಿಂದಲೋ ಅಷ್ಟೇ ಹತ್ತು ವರ್ಷಗಳ ಹಿಂದೆ ನಾನು ಅನುಕ್ರಮದಿಂದಲೂ, ಅವತ್ತಿನಿಂದ ಇವತ್ತಿನವರೆಗೂ ನನ್ನ ಸ್ವಾಂಟ್ ಅಂದೇನಿತ್ತೋ ಅದರಲ್ಲಿ ಒಂದು ಸ್ವಲ್ಪವೂ ಬದಲಾಯಿಸಿಲ್ಲ, ಬದಲಾಯಿಸುವ ಇಚ್ಛೆ ಇಲ್ಲ. ಅವರು ಯಾರೇ ಆಗಿರಲಿ, ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಗಳಾಗಿರಲಿ, ಅಧಿಕಾರೇತರರಾಗಿರಲಿ, ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳಾಗಿರಲಿ, ಹಿಂದಿನ ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳಾಗಿರಲಿ, ಮುಂದೆ ಬರಬಹುದಾದ ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳಾಗಿರಲಿ,.....

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಡಿ. ದೇವೇಗೌಡ.—ಹಾಗಾದರೆ ಮುಂದೆ ಬರುವವರೂ ಇದ್ದಾರೆ ಅಂತ ಆಯಿತಲ್ಲಾ?

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಎಂ. ಚನ್ನಬಸಪ್ಪ.—ಯಾರೇ ಆಗಿರಲಿ, ಈ ಶರಾವತಿ ಒಂದು ಪ್ರಕರಣವೇ ಅಲ್ಲ; ಇನ್ನೂ ಏನೇನು ಪ್ರಕರಣಗಳು ಇವೆ ಅವುಗಳೂ ಕೂಡ ಈ ಸಭೆಯ ಮುಂದೆ ಬಂದಿವೆ:

“Government is also applying its mind to all aspects of the question including location of causes for the damages in the several components of the water conductor system not only with a view to set right matters but also to examine the failure in duties of all concerned and fix up responsibilities.”

ಈ ಜ್ಯುಡಿಸಿಯರ್ ಪ್ರೋಬ್ ಅಂತ ಏನು ಹೇಳುತ್ತಾ ಇದ್ದೀರಿ ಅದು ಇದಕ್ಕೆ ಹೊರಪಟ್ಟಿಲ್ಲ. ಈ ಸ್ಟೇಟ್‌ಮೆಂಟ್‌ನಲ್ಲಿ ಜ್ಯುಡಿಸಿಯರ್ ಪ್ರೋಬ್ ಅನ್ನುವುದೂ ಕೂಡ 'It is one of the ways of doing it.' ನಿಮ್ಮ ಅಪೇಕ್ಷೆ ಏನಿದೆ ಅದೇ ಪ್ರಮಾಣದಲ್ಲಿ ಸರ್ಕಾರದ ಅಪೇಕ್ಷೆಯೂ ಇದೆ. ನಿಮ್ಮ ಅಪೇಕ್ಷೆಯೇ ಸರ್ಕಾರದ ಅಪೇಕ್ಷೆ. ಈ ವಿಷಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಭಿನ್ನಾಭಿಪ್ರಾಯ ನನಗಂತೂ ಕಂಡು ಬರುತ್ತಾ ಇಲ್ಲ. ನಾನು ಮೊದಲೇ ಹೇಳಿದ ಮಾನ್ಯ ಮುಖ್ಯ ಮಂತ್ರಿಗಳು ಹೇಳಿದ ರೀತಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಏನೇನು ಅವಶ್ಯಕ ಎಂದು ಕಂಡುಬರುತ್ತದೆಯೋ ಅದನ್ನೆಲ್ಲಾ ಮಾಡುತ್ತೇವೆ ಎಂದು ಹೇಳಿದ್ದೇನೆ. ಇದು ಒಂದೇ ವಿಷಯ ಅಲ್ಲ. ಇನ್ನೂ ಹಲವು ವಿಷಯಗಳು ಶರಾವತಿಗೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ್ಟವು ಎಲ್ಲವೂ ಸೇರಿ...

Sri H. D. DEVE GOWDA.—You want to make a piecemeal statement; What does it mean?

Sri C. M. ARUMUGAM.—That means the present statement is not exhaustive.

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಎಂ. ಚನ್ನಬಸಪ್ಪ.—ಇವತ್ತು ಏನು ಚರ್ಚೆ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದೇವೆ, ಯಾವ್ಯಾವುದು ಡ್ಯಾಮೇಜ್ ಆಗಿದೆ ಆ ವಿಚಾರದ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಸಮಸ್ತವಾದಂತಹ ಸ್ಟೇಟ್‌ಮೆಂಟ್‌ನೂ ಕೊಟ್ಟು ಶರಾವತಿ ವಿಷಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಏನೇನು ಅಪನಡವಳಿಕೆಗಳು ನಡೆದಿವೆ, ದುರಸ್ತಡಾವಳಿಗಳು ನಡೆದಿವೆ ಅವುಗಳ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಕೂಲಂಕಷವಾಗಿ ವಿಚಾರಣೆ ಮಾಡಬೇಕು ಎನ್ನುವುದರಲ್ಲಿ—I am one with you.

Sri H. D. DEVE GOWDA.—You may be one with us. But I want to know whether your leader is one with us?

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಎಂ. ಚನ್ನಬಸಪ್ಪ.—ನಮಗೆ ಸ್ವಂತ ಆಡಳಿತದ ಅನುಭವ ಇದೆ, ನಾವೆಂದೂ ಮುಚ್ಚಿಟ್ಟಿಲ್ಲ, ಇದುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಸಾಧ್ಯವಿಲ್ಲ. ನಮಗೆ ವರ್ತಮಾನ ಬರತಕ್ಕ ಹಲವಾರು ಸಂಸ್ಥೆಗಳು ಇವೆ.

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಡಿ. ದೇವೇಗೌಡ.—ಚನ್ನಬಸಪ್ಪನವರು ಮುಚ್ಚಿಡುವ ಮನುಷ್ಯರು ಅಲ್ಲ ಚಾಣಾಕ್ಯಶೂರರು ಎಂದು ಗೊತ್ತು.

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಎಂ. ಚನ್ನಬಸಪ್ಪ.—ಸ್ಯವನ್ನು ಮರೆಮಾಚುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಎಳ್ಳಷ್ಟೂ ಶಕ್ತಿ ನನಗೆ ಇಲ್ಲ ಎಂಬುದು ಅವರಿಗೆ ಗೊತ್ತು. ಆದ್ದರಿಂದ ಫ್ಯಾಕ್ಟುಯಲ್ ಸ್ಟೇಟ್‌ಮೆಂಟ್ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದೇನೆ. ಇದರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಚರ್ಚೆಯಾಗಬೇಕೆಂದು ಕೆಲವರು ಹೇಳಿದರು, ಕೆಲವರು ಬೇಡ ಎಂದು ಹೇಳಿದರು. ಯಾವುದೇ ಆಗಲಿ ನನಗಂತೂ ಏನೂ ಆಡ್ತಿ ಇಲ್ಲ, ಅದು ತಮಗೆ ಬಿಟ್ಟದ್ದು ತಾವು ಚರ್ಚೆ ಆಗಬಹುದು ಎಂದರೆ ಆಗಬಹುದು, ಬೇಡ ಎಂದರೆ ಬಿಡಬಹುದು. ಮತ್ತು ಮುಂದಿನ ವರ್ಷಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಸರ್ಕಾರ ಸಕಾಲದಲ್ಲಿ ಅವಶ್ಯಕವಾದ ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮಗಳನ್ನು ತೆಗೆದುಕೊಳ್ಳುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂದು ನಾನು ಈ ಸಭೆಗೆ ಅರಿಕೆ ಮಾಡುತ್ತೇನೆ.

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಡಿ. ದೇವೇಗೌಡ.—ಸಕಾಲ ಎಂದರೆ ಯಾವುದಾದರೂ ಒಂದು ನಿಗದಿಯಾದ ವೇಳೆಯಾದರೂ ಹೇಳಿ. ಸಕಾಲ ಎಂದರೆ ಯಾವಾಗ?

ಅಧ್ಯಕ್ಷರು.—ಮಾನ್ಯ ಸದಸ್ಯರಿಗೆ ಚರ್ಚೆ ಮಾಡುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಬೇಕಾದಷ್ಟು ಅವಕಾಶ ಇದೆ. ಈಗ ಮುಂದಿನ ವಿಷಯಕ್ಕೆ ಹೋಗೋಣ.

Discussion of a matter raised under Rule 312

re: Purchase of the Begam Mahal by the Bangalore City Municipal Corporation

ಶ್ರೀ ಎಚ್. ಡಿ. ದೇವೇಗೌಡ.—ಈಗ ಮಾನ್ಯ ಸ್ಥಳೀಯ ಸಂಸ್ಥೆಗಳ ಸಚಿವರು ಸಭೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಇದ್ದಾರೆ. ಆದ್ದರಿಂದ ಅವರ ಗಮನವನ್ನು ಸೆಳೆಯುವುದರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಈ ವಿಷಯ ಪ್ರಸ್ತಾಪ ಮಾಡ ಬೇಕೆಂದು ನಿನ್ನೆ ದಿವಸ ತಮಗೆ ಕಳುಹಿಸಿ ಕೊಟ್ಟಿದ್ದೇನೆ. ಕನ್ನಡ ಪ್ರಭಾ ಪತ್ರಿಕೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಕಾರ್ಪೊರೇಷನ್‌ನವರು ಬೇಗಂ ಮಹಲ್ ಎನ್ನುವ ಒಂದು ಕಟ್ಟಡವನ್ನು ತೆಗೆದುಕೊಳ್ಳಬೇಕೆಂದು ನಿರ್ಣಯ ತೆಗೆದುಕೊಂಡಿದ್ದಾರೆ ಎಂದು ಬಂದಿದೆ. ಹದಿಮೂರೂವರೆ ಲಕ್ಷ ರೂಪಾಯಿಗಳಿಗೆ ಕೊಳ್ಳಬೇಕೆಂದು